In an imperfectly competitive industry, differentiated products compete with each other with price rather than quantity as the strategic variable. Several previous studies have employed a generalized Nash Bertrand model: Liang (1989 ), Cotterill (1994 , Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar (2000) , and Kinoshita, Suzuki, Kawamura, Watanabe and Kaiser (2001); however, only Liang has explored the theoretical foundations of that model. This paper generalizes the Liang two good model to three goods. A surprising and important result follows. Price conjectural variations do not exist in models with 3 or more goods. Price reaction functions, however, exist in multiple good models. We estimate them jointly with a brand level demand system to evaluate the total impact of a brand manager's price change on own quantity. In a differentiated product market this is a useful addition to a partial demand elasticity approach because a change in one brand's price typically engenders a price reaction by other brands which affects own quantity via substantial cross price elasticities among substitutes. Strategic pricing in the Boston fluid milk market was also influenced by the existence of a raw milk price support program, the Northeast Dairy Compact. We find that the advent of the Compact was a focal point event that crystallized a shift away from Nash Bertrand to more cooperative pricing. If the downstream market is not competitive one needs to consider strategic price reactions when designing and evaluating agricultural price programs.
Introduction
Several studies have investigated the nature of competition in differentiated product markets where price is the strategic choice variable. Most have assumed Nash Bertrand competition, i.e. zero valued price conjectures. 1 Residual demand analysis (Baker and Breshnahan, 1985) implicitly relaxes the Nash Bertrand assumption, and the total elasticity approach of Liang (1989) , Cotterill (1994) and others explicitly relaxes it. Moreover for the Boston fluid milk market the Northeast Dairy Compact program, a raw milk policy that established a price floor to enhance dairy farm income, serves as an external stimulus that allows one to evaluate shifts in strategic conduct. Cotterill and Franklin (2001) , for example, use IRI scanner data in combination with raw fluid milk price data to describe the Northeast Dairy Compact's impact on market pricing strategies. They identify price leaders, and estimate crude brand level demand curves for Garelick, Hood and private label milk in Boston IRI market area.
2 They report that processor-retailer margins increased when farm level fluid milk prices were elevated slightly and stabilized by the Compact. Their estimated market and brand level elasticities suggest that the exercise of market power is a source of wider margins and higher retail prices during the Compact period. Finally, their review of the historical events in the New England milk industry support a focal point collusion strategy at Compact implementation. Dhar (2001) examines pricing in the Boston fluid milk market in a much more rigorous fashion using structural econometric models. His work is also at the brand level and disaggregated from the market to the supermarket chain level. He concludes that competitive behavior of retailers in Boston during the Compact period changed with oligopolistic retail 1 In antitrust analysis this is the well known unilateral effects model (Ivaldi et al., 2003; Hausman et al., 1994) . 2 They fit a regression line through the price quantity scatter plot for each brand.
pricing becoming soft as major retailers responded positively to each other's price changes.
The estimated profit margins and the estimated profit per period were higher after the implementation of the Northeast Dairy Compact. Dhar also finds that estimated profit margins across brands are higher for private labels. Chidmi et al. (2005) ignore product differentiation and aggregate all milk purchases to the market level by assuming milk is a homogeneous good. Then they use Appelbaum's (1982) quantity-setting conjectural variation approach to evaluate the degree of collusion and market power in the Boston fluid milk market. `Their aggregate market level conjectural variation elasticity estimate is .1229 and is significantly different than zero at the 1 % level, which indicates that there is some collusion in Boston fluid milk market. They also examined how the conjectural variation elasticity varied over time to assess the impact of the North East Dairy Compact. They report that the conjectural variation elasticity is higher during the Compact era and the difference is statistically significant. This paper rigorously extends the Liang (1989) two-brand differentiated product oligopoly model to three brands in the Boston fluid milk market. In Liang's two good model price conjectural variations for each firm can then be estimated directly. The advantage of this approach is apparent in the context of a differentiated product market. When products are not homogeneous, market conduct is brand specific, and strategic. Profits may be a poor indicator of the degree of price competition (Liang, 1989) .
As analyzed in Canan (2002) and the next section conjectural variation parameters cannot be identified in Bertrand differentiated product oligopoly that has more than two brands. Fortunately the slopes of the reaction functions also provide useful information about strategic firm behavior. In models with 3 or more goods one must use price reaction elasticities, not conjectural variations to measure market power at the brand level. Reaction elasticities capture actual price behavior rather than conjectured behavior, and can be estimated for any oligopoly model.
Theoretical Models
Liang's structural econometric model has 2 demand equations and 2 price reaction equations. More succinctly, the market has 2 brands that are owned by separate firms. Cross equation restrictions link the estimated price reaction function coefficients to estimated demand coefficients. This aids in estimating the model and allows one to identify the two brand managers' price conjectures. Liang assumes that the differentiated product demand function for firm 1 is a simple linear relationship and is a function of the two prices and income:
where: Q 1 is the output of firm 1, P 1 is the price for firm 1 and P 2 is the price for firm 2.
Differentiating this demand equation with respect to own price, one obtains:
where:
is the firm i's price conjectural variation with respect to firm j. The total own price demand elasticity that firm 1 faces is;
This total own price demand elasticity has 3 parts; (a) the firm's partial own-price elasticity , an increase in the cross elasticity will cause the elasticity of demand to decline and market power is raised.
When one has rivalrous pricing one has cv, >0 and 0
Rivalry makes a firm's demand more elastic. If the conjectural variation, cv 1 and the corresponding conjectural elasticity, 21 ε equals 0, i.e. one has Bertrand competition, then the total own price demand elasticity, 1 η is equal to the partial own price elasticity, 11 η . The partial own price elasticity is called the unilateral demand elasticity in antitrust analysis (Ivaldi et al., 2003) .
One completes the Liang model by analyzing each firm's profit maximization problem when price is the strategic choice variable. Firm 1's profit maximization problem is:
where C 1 is the production cost of firm 1. Firm 1 maximizes profits, 1 Π , by choosing price, P 1 . The firm's first order condition for profit maximization is;
and MC 1 is the marginal cost of firm 1.This first order condition can be expressed as a price reaction function. The continuous price reaction function R 1 (P 2 ) define the firm's price as a function of its rival's price and its own marginal cost.
R 1 (P 2 ):
The coefficient on rival price (f 11 ) is a direct measure of price interdependence.
Liang demonstrates that these coefficients in the 2 good case exhibit the same properties as the Lerner Index (Liang, 1989) . Price cost margin (PCM), which is the difference between price (P) and marginal cost (MC) as a fraction of price ([P-MC]/P) and is also called the Lerner Index, can be calculated by using the following form:
In this 2 good model, conjectural variations (cv 1 , cv 2 ) can be identified and actually estimated by using the first order profit maximization conditions because the price reaction function coefficients depend upon the demand coefficients and the conjectural variations. If one has an estimate of f 11 , and the demand function coefficients b 1 , c 1 , one can solve Equation (2.8) for an estimate of cv 1 . The formula is: One can not explicitly solve for individual brand level conjectural variations when one has 3 or more brands in the model because of a singular matrix in the solution (Canan, 2002) . Note that one has two equations and two unknowns; however, one has the same estimated parameters on cv 21 and cv 31 in the two equations. This redundancy generates the singularity.
Moreover assuming equal conjectural variations across firms does not solve the singularity problem.
This result presents a critical question. How can one determine the degree of competition in a market or the degree of market power that is being exercised by brand managers if one can not identify and measure conjectural variations? In this study, we will use price reaction elasticities, not conjectural variations to measure market power at the brand level and test for conduct that is not Bertrand. To illustrate our approach let us examine the focal point collusion hypothesis that others have suggested that explains the observed price conduct in the Boston fluid milk market.
In the 3 good model we assume that competition is Bertrand before the Compact. Each brand's pre-Compact PCM is an inverse function of its unilateral own price elasticity, ii η . One can calculate a brand's PCM before the Compact as follows: 
Empirical Model Specification
In Boston there are 3 major brands of fluid milk: Hood, Garelick and private label. We aggregate to the brand level by taking a market share weighted average of different types of milk, including skim and whole milk, to obtain brand prices for gallons of milk. Based upon the 3 good model developed above we specify a simultaneous system of 6 equations.
There are 3 demand equations, one for each brand of milk. The 3 corresponding price reaction equations complete the model. Table 1 defines the variables used in the 3 good empirical model for branded milk in Boston. In addition to the endogenous brand price and per capita quantity variables we specify the following exogenous variables: per capita income in the demand equations: and for each brand two cost proxies, unit sales per volume, and the share of skim milk in a brand's sales. The first cost variable measures the higher cost of packaging when milk is sold in less than gallon sizes; and the second measures the lower raw product cost when milk has less butterfat. Finally, we specify a binary variable, D, to identify the Compact era and test for different price conduct in it as opposed to during the pre-Compact era.
Our initial work revealed that there is an extremely high level of multicollinearity between the price of Garelick and private label milk. 3 Table 2 reports the regression results of the relationship between Garelick and PL retail prices (
). The coefficient on PL retail price is significantly different than zero at the 1 % level and the adjusted R 2 is 0.95.
We have also tested whether the estimated coefficient for private label price in Table 2 is different from one and the hypothesis is rejected with the t-ratio of 6.88.
The high multicollinearity between Garelick and PL affected our initial estimation results causing a bizarre complementarity between Garelick and PL, which is not the case.
Garelick and private label milk are substitutes. Because of the high multicollinearity between
Garelick and PL, we have dropped Garelick price from the model which is presented in Table 3 asymptotically the same as nonlinear three-stage least square estimation (Green, 2000) . Table   4 reports the estimation results. In the Hood demand equation, the own price coefficient for
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Hood is -1.458 and significant at 1% level. As hypothesized the demand curve has negative slope. The Cross-price coefficient for the private label in the Hood demand equation is 1.22 and significant at the 1% level. PL and Hood are substitutes in the Hood demand equation.
When price of PL increases, Hood quantity demanded increases, because consumers switch to from PL to Hood.
When we look at the Garelick demand equation, we see that the coefficients for Hood and PL prices are 0.362 and -2.68 respectively. They are both significant at 1% level. When price of Hood increases $1, Garelick quantity demanded increases 0.362 which tells us that 4 The series have been tested for the existence of unit root by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test. The hypothesis of the existence of unit root has been rejected for the series.
consumers switch to Garelick from Hood. When price of PL goes up $1, the price regression on Table 2 predicts Garelick price goes up $1.25. Garelick quantity demanded decreases 2.68
gallons.
In the PL demand equation, the own-price coefficient for PL is -2.60 and significant at 1% level. The cross-price coefficient for Hood is positive and significant at 1% level. Hood and PL are substitutes as in the Hood demand equation.
The coefficient for income is expected to be positive assuming that milk is a normal good, i.e. as income of a household increases the milk consumption of that household is going to increase. In fact it is positive and significant at 1% level in the Hood and Garelick demand equations, but in the PL demand equation it is negative and significant at 1% level. The negative sign in the PL demand equation suggests that as income increases consumers switch to the more expensive brands from the store brand. As reported in Figure 1 PL has a lower retail price than Hood and Garelick throughout the sample period. At low income levels households consume mostly PL, and as their income increases they switch to higher priced brands, Hood and Garelick.
To determine whether competition in the Compact era deviates from Nash-Bertrand conduct, we examine the Compact binary and price interaction variable coefficients. Both are positive significantly different from zero at 1% level in the price reaction equations. These results suggest that pricing conduct became more collusive during the Compact period.
When strategic pricing becomes more collusive as documented in this market, one would expect to see brand level demand curves become more inelastic, price cost margins become higher, and prices increase. Table 5 reports brand level own price demand elasticities before and during the Compact. Elasticities before the Compact are unilateral demand elasticities, i.e. they are based on Nash-Bertrand pricing. Note that Hood, the highest priced brand, has the most elastic demand at -5.1639; and, private label is least elastic at -1.533.
Consumers are much less sensitive to price changes for the low price brand than to changes for the high price brand. After the shift to more collusive price conduct during the Compact period Hood's price elasticity becomes much less elastic, Garelick's becomes somewhat less elastic and at -.8661 private label's becomes inelastic. Consumers have less opportunity to switch between brands due to the addition in divergent price offers among the brands. Table 6 reports estimated price cost margins for each brand during the two periods.
The price cost margins shift dramatically for Hood, increasing from 19.37% pre-Compact to 36.53% during the Compact. Hood clearly benefited from the shift towards cooperative pricing. The Garelick brand's margins increase is much more modest, from 30 to 32 percent.
The private label price cost margin shift is literally off the chart. During the Compact it increases to 115 percent, which is impossible since it implies negative marginal cost.
Perhaps a chart of the data will aid in understanding brand price strategies and our estimation results. closely match the raw milk price move. This is the focal point move to a new strategic pricing game that we capture in our model. Note that the spread between retail and raw milk prices for all brands are visibly higher during the Compact period. Our model confirms that an increase in price cost margins is a significant source of this increase in the marketing spread between raw and retail milk prices.
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Note also in Figure 1 that private label and the "tethered" Garelick price move up much more than Hood price. In a more collusive pricing strategy it makes sense for the most price elevation to occur on the least elastic brands. Hood milk becomes less elastic because the prices of its rivals move up towards its premium price. Consumers in fact did switch to
Hood during this period, shifting the Hood demand curve out (Cotterill and Franklin, 2001 ).
Although private label prices are the lowest in Figure 1 , private label price cost margins are the highest because marginal costs for private label are much lower. Others have documented theoretically and empirically that private label have lower prices and higher margins than branded products (Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 2000; Mills 1995) .
Conclusions
This study generalizes the Liang two good strategic pricing model to three goods.
With more than two goods one can not estimate price conjectures to measure pricing conduct in a differentiated product market. We propose and use price reaction functions and related price reaction elasticities to assess the degree of competition. Using data from the Boston fluid milk market for three brands we specify and estimate a three good model. Estimated results suggest that retail pricing strategy shifted at that focal point event from Nash-Bertrand pricing to a more collusive pricing game. Recognizing rivals' price reaction responses reduces own price elasticities and elevates price cost margins. Models of this type for differentiated products are useful for mangers who seek to maximize profits as well as for policy analysis.
On the latter, the Northeast Dairy Compact generated an unintended strategic price response that exacerbated its impact on consumers. Retail milk prices went up by more than one would have expected given prior retailer price conduct. Therein lies an important insight for agricultural policy. If the downstream market is not competitive one needs to consider strategic price reactions when designing and evaluating agricultural price programs. 
